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China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ – Transnational and 
Multilevel Rule of Law Challenges from a European 
Perspective 
 
Henrik Andersen1 
 
Abstract: 
The article concerns the rule of law challenges associated with the One Belt One Road 
programme initiated by China. The aim of OBOR is to increase efficient resource allocation 
and to integrate markets in the more than 60 participating states in Eurasia. Rule of law is 
essential from a market economy perspective as it provides the market agents with legal 
certainty about their investments and should be considered as part of the OBOR strategy. 
The OBOR rule of law challenges are a result of 1) different political and normative 
approaches to rule of law where the article compares rules of law in a Chinese and European 
context to highlight such differences as well as finding similarities between them and 2) the 
multilevel nature of rule of law at national and international level. OBOR will have both a 
transnational and international dimension where China may influence the rules of laws 
developments in OBOR’s many sectors and levels. However, there are some minimum 
requirements to rule of law which should be upheld in OBOR in order to protect legal 
certainty for the participating OBOR parties. Some rule of law challenges have already 
answers in existing multilateral systems, others need to be handled as OBOR progresses. 
 
Introduction 
In 2013 the President of China, Xi Jinping, initiated the One Belt One Road (OBOR) 
programme. A Euro-Asian land bridge as well as a 21st century Maritime Silk Road will be 
established. OBOR aims at facilitating trade between Asia, Africa and Europe by reducing 
trade barriers, improving infrastructure and increase cooperation in numerous sectors between 
the more than 60 countries which will be involved with China as the main coordinator. One of 
the core OBOR principles is to let the market have a decisive role in order to achieve efficient 
allocation of resources.2  
The paper discusses the transnational and multilevel rule of law challenges of OBOR from a 
European perspective. The focus will mainly be on issues related to economic law and of 
relevance for market participants. At its most basic level, rule of law means that law is 
supreme.3 Rule of law protects legal certainty and thus provides the agents on the market with 
expectations that their investments can be protected in accordance with law and that the state 
                                                 
1 Senior Lecturer, Lancashire Law School, UCLAN; PhD from Copenhagen Business School in WTO and EU 
law. For questions please contact; handersen@uclan.ac.uk 
2 Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, 
2015/03/28, Issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, with State Council authorization, March (2015), part 
II: Principles. See more below. 
3 See more below for a discussion of rule of law. 
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will not overstep its constitutional mandate in its relation with the agents of the market.4 For 
all market participants – public and private – which are going to be part of making OBOR into 
reality, clarification of rule of law will be essential. 
The rule of law challenges in the context of OBOR are transnational as ‘rule of law’ can be 
based in both liberal and socialist systems. Rule of law is often considered to be anchored in 
Western liberal ideologies, but it is applied in China with a more authoritarian and collective 
approach. Rule of law is in itself not a clear concept and has no clear authoritative definition. 
The OBOR cross-border activities between market agents and states can be a clash of different 
conceptual and normative perceptions of rules of law across the jurisdictions and the question 
is whether such overlaps between different rules of law will find new ways to overcome 
potential conflicts and transplant into each other’s respective systems.  
The multilevel challenge is reflected by the elevation of rule of law to an international level. 
Rule of law at international level cannot easily be understood in the context of the traditional 
state definitions. With state sovereignty as basic assumption of international law, states become 
both law-makers and subjects of law. Thus one question concerns the relationship between the 
power of the state to decide law on international level and a commitment to be under law. Into 
that equation must be considered rule of law developments from international organizations. 
OBOR goes not only across a number of state jurisdictions but it also crosses into a number of 
international organizations, including the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
The overall aims of OBOR will be outlined in the next part. Thereafter, the concept of rule of 
law will be elaborated. There will be a comparison between Chinese and European approaches 
to rule of law highlighting some rule of law similarities and differences. Furthermore, rule of 
law will be discussed in a global and transnational context. Finally, the OBOR rule of law 
challenges will be discussed with focus on Chinese soft and hard approaches to OBOR and the 
transnational and international rule of law challenges in the context of OBOR. 
 
OBOR and Its Aims 
In March 2015, the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
released a joint paper concerning the “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road 
Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road” outlining the overall aims and visions of 
OBOR. According to the joint paper, OBOR is a result of slow growth in the World economy, 
uneven global development, and financial crises. It takes into account economic globalization 
and the multi-polar world, cultural diversity and the higher level of IT application.  
OBOR will involve countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe. The aims are to promote orderly and 
free flow of economic factors, a highly efficient allocation of resources and deep integration of 
markets. It aims at encouraging the implied countries to “achieve economic policy coordination 
and carry out broader and more in-depth regional cooperation of higher standards; and jointly 
                                                 
4 See for example Karla Hoff and Joseph Stiglitz, After the Big Bang? – Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule 
of Law in Post-Communist Societies, The American Economic Review, June (2004) 753; Samuel Bufford, 
International Rule of Law and The Market Economy - An Outline, Southwestern Journal of Law & Trade in the 
Americas, 12 (2006) 303 
3 
 
creating an open, inclusive and balanced regional economic cooperation architecture that 
benefits all.”5  
The core principles of OBOR are: 
 Be in line with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. 
 Upholding the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. 
 Openness for cooperation for countries and international and regional organizations. 
 Inclusiveness and harmony with tolerance among civilizations and respect of respective 
countries’ development.  
 Supporting dialogue between different civilizations where common ground is to be 
sought in order to be in peace for common prosperity. 
 Abiding market rules and international norms where market will have a decisive role in 
allocation of resources with a primary role of enterprises and where governments 
“perform their due functions”. 
 Seeking mutual benefits for all parties involved.6 
The cooperation priorities are policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, 
financial integration and people-to-people bonds. Policy coordination aims to promote 
intergovernmental cooperation between China and the implied states. Facilities connectivity 
concerns the transport and energy infrastructure taking into account state sovereignty and 
security policies. Unimpeded Trade concerns improvement of investment and trade facilitation, 
including ensuring that the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement takes effect and lowering non-
tariff barriers and enhance trade liberalization. Financial Integration concerns financial 
cooperation and currency stability. That will involve the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) and BRICS Development Bank – and will involve cooperation on multilateral and 
bilateral level in order to strengthen the risk response, the risk warning systems, and the 
financial crisis management. People-to-people bond concerns the public support for OBOR 
including exchange students, exchange culture, increase tourism between participating states, 
increase joint research activities, and focus on employment.7 
Since 2008, the European Union (EU) and China have negotiated to establish a bilateral 
investment agreement. The European need for Chinese investments is a result of the Eurozone 
crisis and OBOR can serve as a short-term solution before the bilateral investment agreement 
will take effect.8 In a joint statement between the European Economic and Social Committee 
and China Economic and Social Council from May 2016, they emphasised the importance of 
                                                 
5 Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, 
2015/03/28, Issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, with State Council authorization, March (2015), part I: 
Background 
6 Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, 
2015/03/28, Issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, with State Council authorization, March (2015), part 
II: Principles 
7 Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, 
2015/03/28, Issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, with State Council authorization, March (2015), part 
III: Framework 
8 Insa Ewert, The EU-China Bilateral Investment Agreement: Between High Hopes and Real Challenges, Security 
Policy Brief, 68, February (2016). 
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reciprocity by being stakeholders in each other’s financial institutions; A number of EU 
Member states are Members of the AIIB,9 and China is involved with the European Fund for 
Strategic Investment. They also highlighted principles of internationally agreed standards in 
respect of public procurement, environmental protection, human rights, and labour and social 
protection.10 OBOR is also of interest for European enterprises. For example, the China-Britain 
Business Council and the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office have stressed that European 
Companies can form partnerships with Chinese companies, like joint partnerships, technology 
transfer, investment funding, public-private partnerships in areas related to infrastructure, 
financial and professional services, advanced manufacturing, and transport and logistics.11  
OBOR differs from the traditional international law framework where rules and directions are 
set in treaties. OBOR is more network oriented. The overall aims do not have a clearly defined 
pathway yet. The road to OBOR will be established as the project develops. However, OBOR 
will cross into already established regional and international legal, economic and political 
regimes. For example, the AIIB takes some of the same functions as the World Bank.12 
However, it is believed that OBOR do not seek to replace already established international 
trading systems.13 OBOR must here comply with WTO law concerning custom duty 
reductions,14 the antidumping battles between China and the EU,15 establishments of public-
private partnerships and government procurement,16 and the WTO Trade Facilitation 
Agreement.17 
The ambitious OBOR project, with its dialogue based approach, will meet a more rule oriented 
Europe and it will cross into already established multilateral frameworks. It will be necessary 
to establish a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements between China and European 
states and the EU. The project is to a large extent market-based with participation of private 
and public institutions to carry out the projects following market principles.18 In a market 
                                                 
9 Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the 
UK. In addition, Non-EU states like Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland are Members. 
10 European Economic and Social Committee and China Economic and Social Council, Joint Statement – 14th 
Meeting of the EU-China Round Table, Brussels, 18 and 19 May 2016, paras 6-10 
11 China-Britain Business Council and UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, One Belt One Road – A role for UK 
companies in developing China’s new initiative – New opportunities in China and beyond, 2016, at 5 
12 M. Wan, The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: The Construction of Power and the Struggle for the East 
Asian International Order, (New York, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian, 2016), 58 
13 See David Cohen, China’s “second opening”: Grand ambitions but a long road ahead, in “One Belt, One Road”: 
China’s Great Leap Outward, European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2015, at 3 
14 Reduction of custom duties for the implied states can be a violation of the Most Favoured Nations principles, 
for example, GATT 1994 Art. I but can be accepted if it complies with Art. XXIV concerning Free Trade 
Agreements and Custom Unions.  
15 See for example Art. VI of GATT 1994 and the Antidumping Agreement and the special antidumping rules 
towards China as – from an EU perspective – a non-market economy in the Chinese Accession Protocol, Art. 15. 
There have been a number of disputes between China and the EU concerning antidumping duties imposed by both 
parties. 
16 Government procurement and public-private partnerships might be covered by the Plurilateral Government 
Procurement Agreement in the WTO which China has not signed but keeps an observer status. However, other of 
the implied states are bound by the Government Procurement Agreement. 
17 WTO Agreement of Trade Facilitation, WT/L/931 of 15 July 2014. The Trade Facilitation Agreement will 
become part of the WTO Agreement and take effect once 2/3 of the WTO Members have ratified it. 
18 See above; Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk 
Road, 2015/03/28, Issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, with State Council authorization, March (2015), 
part II: Principles 
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economy, it is a prerequisite that rule of law applies for those agents who invest in order to 
create value whereas rule of law is less important – or even problematic - for asset strippers 
and agents involved in money laundering.19 In theory, rule of law protects the agents of the 
market as it provides stability and certainty. For example, an investor cannot expect the market 
to act in a specific way but the investor can have legal expectations that the investment is safe 
through law. For example, company law will often provide the shareholders tools to act against 
directors if they act beyond the interest of the company or if they have conflict of interests,20 
or competition law will provide the legal tools to keep companies with dominant market 
positions from abusing such positions, like predatory pricing.21 This is not to say that law itself 
is sufficient or without problems. For example, the global financial crisis was partly due to 
weak regulation of the financial sector,22 and where rule of law has more limited power if those 
accountable for the crisis only to a limited extent can be held liable under law.23  
In addition, with the expected bilateral and multilateral agreements between states participating 
in OBOR, it must be assumed that those states will comply with their obligations and put law 
above arbitrary decisions.24 However, different understanding of rules of law – and conceptual 
and legitimate questions by elevating rule of law to an international level – can be a challenge 
to OBOR. To highlight some different conceptual understandings of rule of law, the next part 
will address some differences between European and Chinese rules of law as well as the 
challenge with a global rule of law, before the following part will address in more detail the 
rule of law challenges in OBOR. 
 
Rule of Law and Its Definitions 
It is not the aim here to go into a lengthy debate on the various definitions of rule of law.25 It is 
a hazy concept but can vaguely be defined as the political and moral maxim where law is 
                                                 
19 See for example Karla Hoff and Joseph Stiglitz, After the Big Bang? – Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule 
of Law in Post-Communist Societies, The American Economic Review, June (2004) 753; Samuel Bufford, 
International Rule of Law and The Market Economy - An Outline, Southwestern Journal of Law & Trade in The 
Americas 12 (2006) 303 
20 See for example ss. 170-187 of the UK Companies Act 2006. 
21 Predatory pricing is generally prohibited in various competition laws. See for example Art. 102 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the EU and related case law, like Akzo v Commission, Case C-62/86, Judgment of the Court 
(Fifth Chamber) of 3 July 1991, ECR. 1991 I-3359, and see Art. 17 of Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s 
Republic of China, NPC 30 August 2007. 
22 Final Report of the National Commission On the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in The United 
States – The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report – by the US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, January 2011, p. 
xviii. 
23 It is an essential rule of law requirement that a person cannot be held liable retrospectively. 
24 The principle of pacta sunt servanda is fundamental in international law. It is codified in the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, Art. 26. 
25 See for an overview of different definitions; Paul Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of 
Law: An Analytical Framework’ Public Law, Autumn (1997) 467. See also more elaborated; A. V. Dicey, 
Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed. (reprint by Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1915); 
Jospeh Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, 
2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 210; R. Peerenboom, ‘Varieties of Rule of Law’ in R. 
Peerenboom (ed), Asian Discourses if Rule of Law –  Theories and implementation of rule of law in twelve Asian 
countries, France and the US, (London, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004) 1; F. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, 
The Definitive Edition, B. Caldwell (ed) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007); J. Rawls, A Theory 
of Justice, Revised ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999);  
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supreme and everyone, including the Government, must comply with law.  A violation of rule 
of law can lead to uncertainty as future cannot be planned and from a business perspective the 
investment can carry a higher risk, or a violation of rule of law can lead to frustrations as legal 
expectations are not fulfilled either by a lack of enforcement of law or due to retrospective 
law.26 
The problem with defining rule of law lies in its different perceptions as either formal or 
substantive. A formal rule of law does not judge on the content on law but merely provides the 
necessary tools to keep law supreme. From the formal approach, Raz has suggested in a non-
exhaustive list some of the most important rule of law elements: 1) All laws should be 
prospective, open, and clear, 2) laws should be relatively stable, 3) the making of particular 
laws (particular legal orders) should be guided by open, stable, clear, and general rules, 4) the 
independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed, 5) the principles of natural justice must be 
observed, 6) the courts should have review powers over the implementation of the other 
principles, 7) the courts should be easily accessible, and 8) the discretion of the crime-
preventing agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law.27 Even though this version of rule 
of law is claimed to be value-neutral, it still provides a value-oriented framework where it is 
taken for granted that courts – or other independent third party institution – provide the best 
solution to uphold law, to observe natural justice, and that the courts can be easily accessed.  
In contrast to a formal rule of law, a substantive rule of law will provide judgement over the 
content of law as not all law can be accepted. That will often be a rule of law requiring 
democratic principles are complied with and/or human rights are protected and with a liberal 
fundament.28 See for example Rawls, who stated that “[O]ne legal order is more justly 
administered than another if it more perfectly fulfils the precepts of the rule of law. It will 
provide a more secure basis for liberty and a more effective means for organizing cooperative 
schemes.”29  Rawls’ rule of law must be understood as implying that various political systems, 
even those without a liberal basis, can have a rule of law but the strength of it is measured by 
its ability to protect liberty.30 
There is not a clear authoritative definition of rule of law but there is reference to ‘rule of law’ 
in a number of various legal and political instruments. For example, in the preamble to the UN 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights it reads: 
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a 
last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights 
should be protected by the rule of law. 
                                                 
Kaarlo Tuori, Ratio and Voluntas – The Tension between Reason and Will in Law, (Farnham, Burlington: Ashgate, 
2011), pp. 207-239 
26 Jospeh Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, 
2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 210 at 222 
27 Jospeh Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, 
2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 210 at 214-218 
28 See for a general discussion Paul Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical 
Framework’ Public Law, Autumn (1997) 467 
29 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1999), at 53. See also M. Radin, ‘Reconsidering the Rule of Law’, Boston University Law Review 
69 (4) (1989) 781 at 787–790. 
30 Ibid. 
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It seems here that there is a distinction between ‘rule of law’ and ‘human rights’ where rule of 
law is instrumental in protecting human rights.  
The Charter of the UN also has a clear link to rule of law. The preamble provides that the UN 
is determined; 
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations 
arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained 
However, in 2004, the UN Secretary-General stated about the rule of law: 
The “rule of law” is a concept at the very heart of the Organization’s mission. 
It refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and 
entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws 
that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms 
and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the 
principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the 
law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation 
in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and 
procedural and legal transparency.31 
This version of rule of law has a more substantial touch as it seems to require conformity with 
human rights. The question is how to define human rights. Regardless of a formal or substantive 
definition of rule of law, it must be expected that states comply with their international 
obligations. Human rights have an abstract level in the Charter of the UN and they are more 
specifically formulated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
However, those conventions are not directly binding on states which have not given their 
consent. For example, China has not ratified the ICCPR. It does not rule out an indirect 
commitment through other means than the covenant itself. For example, in the interpretation 
of treaties, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties opens up for human rights principles 
can serve as interpretative context.32  
As I have written elsewhere, rule of law must be understood as a transnational concept with 
specific traits for the respective jurisdictions. However, in order to be a rule of law it has some 
categorical features and cannot be considered as value-neutral as it must contain;  
“some degree [of protection of] the individual’s right to access justice (…); 
a degree of equality between the subjects of law (…); predictability in the 
sense that the individual and the public can rely on law. In the same line, 
law-making must go through a clear and transparent procedure and 
constitutional basic principles must be reflected in law (…); Such 
constitutional and legal bases must be observed by the law-making and law-
enforcing institutions but must also be protected by an impartial institution, 
like a constitutional court, although other types of political institutions can 
                                                 
31 Report of the Secretary-General, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, 
United Nations Security Council, S/2004/616, 23 August 2004, para. 6, at 4. 
32 See for example the preamble of the VCLT which explicitly refers to human rights and Art. 31(3)(c). 
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provide such functions, which ensures the functionality of the particular 
legal system and law”33 
Thus rule of law cannot escape its liberal fundament as the individual is protected against 
arbitrary decisions from the public authorities and it can to some extent provide judgment of 
law. However, rule of law does not end with protection of the individual against the public. It 
has another dimension; the public is also protected against the ‘individual’. The ‘individual’ 
can take many shapes and the individual may be a strong political and/or economic power. For 
example, under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), multinational companies 
have achieved some human rights protection.34 The political and economic role of multinational 
enterprises should not be underestimated in the global economy. In a global economy with 
multinational enterprises as some of the leading actors,35 it is important to keep in mind that the 
public also must be protected by law. For example, predatory pricing, which can cause damage 
to market participants and the economy, is prohibited in traditional competition laws,36 or in 
some jurisdictions there is liability for corporate manslaughter or homicide.37 It must therefore 
be expected that multinational enterprises can be prosecuted and be held liable for violations 
of law and that governmental institutions, with authority to impose fines or other types of 
sanctions, can expect law to be upheld in courts or other third party institution, which should 
be independent from the government and from the multinational enterprises. Rule of law can 
be problematic to uphold in places with high level of corruption if, for example, the judges are 
open to accept bribery.38 Thus rule of law must be understood as law protecting both the 
individual against the public and the public against the individual. To put differently; rule of 
law protects the minor against the major power within the constitutional and legal boundaries.  
The next two sub-parts will outline different approaches to rule of law. The focus will be on 
Europe and China as they will play major parts in the establishment of OBOR and relevant 
institutions. Thereafter, the rule of law challenges on global level will be discussed. 
 
 
European Approaches to Rule of Law 
It is important to distinguish between different rule of law models in Europe. For example, 
continental European constitutional supremacy models where the individual will have 
constitutional protection of fundamental rights against legislation of law-maker compared to 
                                                 
33 Henrik Andersen, China and the WTO Appellate Body’s Rule of Law, Global Journal of Comparative Law 5 
(2016) 146 at 150-151 
34 See for example the case law from the European Court of Human Rights concerning fair trial, Dombo Beheer 
B.V. v Netherlands, ECHR (1993), Series A, 274; EHRR (1994) 213; or right to privacy, Société Colas Est and 
others v France, Case No. 37971/97 ECHR 2002-III.  
35 See for example about the lobbying power of financial institutions with claims of self-regulation which was one 
cause behind the global financial crisis. See Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra and Thierry Tressel, A Fistful Of Dollars: 
Lobbying And The Financial Crisis, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 26 (1) ( 2012), 195 
36 The powerful multinational enterprises have only limited obligations under public international law due to its 
statist assumptions. However, multinational enterprises can indirectly bind themselves, for example through the 
UN Global Compact and its commitments to human rights, labour standards, environment and anti-corruption. 
See more at; https://www.unglobalcompact.org/ 
37 See for example from the UK the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. 
38 See Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2007, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
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the UK Parliamentarian Supremacy without a codified constitution and where the courts are 
bound to follow acts of Parliament regardless of their content.39 In the UK, the courts only have 
authority to declare acts from Parliament ‘incompatible’ with the ECHR and cannot declare 
them invalid, cf. section 3 and 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Thus rule of law must be 
understood in light of the constitutional and political differences between European states.40 
Nevertheless, the Western European systems have formal liberal-oriented structures in 
common where the outset is the individual but the degree of authority of courts to declare law 
invalid will differ. 
The ECHR has consolidated rule of law in Europe by requiring fair trials,41 prohibition against 
retrospective law,42 prohibition against discrimination43 etc. It provides standing before the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to individuals against their states concerning 
violations of the ECHR. Even though the ECHR has an inter-governmental basis, which is also 
reflected in the approaches to it by its Members, it has transplanted common rule of law 
principles in the Member States.  
A more complex picture is the multilevel rule of law nature of the EU. As suggested by 
Kochenov, a rule of law in the context of the EU must be understood separately from the 
Member states.44 The EU is not a state but it has sovereignty to law creation in specified areas, 
like the EU single market, and a court system with indirect access of EU citizens through the 
national courts’ rights and obligations to forward questions on interpretation of EU law to the 
EU Court of Justice (ECJ),45 and direct access to challenge EU acts from the EU institutions if 
the individual is the addressee of the decision, like the EU Commission’s decisions in 
competition law cases; or if the act is of direct and individual concern to the natural or legal 
person who is not a direct addressee of the act, like EU and foreign companies which are 
                                                 
39 That view can be contested. For example, the courts have accepted the primacy of EU law when it conflicts 
with UK law; see for example the Factortame cases; R v Secretary of State for Transport ex p Factortame Ltd 
(No. 1) [1990] 2 AC 85 and R v Secretary of State for Transport ex p Factortame Ltd (No. 2)(C-213/89) [1991] 1 
AC 603. See also the comment from former Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Lord Woolf:  
“However, if Parliament did the unthinkable, then I would say that the courts would also be required to act in a 
manner which would be without precedent. Some judges might chose to do so by saying that it was an unrebuttable 
presumption that Parliament could never intend such a result. I myself would consider there were advantages in 
making it clear that ultimately there are even limits on the supremacy of Parliament which it is the courts' 
inalienable responsibility to identify and uphold. They are limits of the most modest dimensions which I believe 
any democrat would accept. They are no more than are necessary to enable the rule of law to be preserved.”  Lord 
Woolf, Droit public - English style, Public Law (Spring, 1995) 57 at 69. 
40 See for a discussion about different types of constitutional systems and their different effect on rule of law as a 
result of their underlying ‘ratio’ and ‘voluntas’ in Kaarlo Tuori, Ratio and Voluntas – The Tension between Reason 
and Will in Law, (Farnham, Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 207-239. 
41 Art. 6 of the ECHR. 
42 Art. 7 of the ECHR. 
43 Art. 14 of the ECHR. 
44 Dimitry Kochenov, The EU Rule of Law: Cutting Paths Through Confusion, Erasmus Law Review 2 (1) 5 at 
18. 
45 Art. 267 of the TFEU. 
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affected by EU antidumping measures;46 or the final category, concerning regulatory measures 
of direct concern which do not entail implementation into the domestic systems.47 
The rule of law is codified into the EU treaties. For example, it follows from the preamble of 
the Treaty on the European Union (TEU): 
DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist 
inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of 
the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, 
democracy, equality and the rule of law, (…) CONFIRMING their 
attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law, 
Art. 2 of the TEU provides: 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including 
the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to 
the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail 
The Charter of the EU provides in its preamble: 
Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the 
indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and 
solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It 
places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the 
citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and 
justice 
Rule of law is also reflected in EU case law. For example, in Les Verts v Parliament, the Court 
of Justice of the EU (ECJ) stated: 
The European Economic Community is based on the rule of law, inasmuch 
as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the 
question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the 
basic constitutional charter, the Treaty, [which] established a complete 
system of legal remedies and procedures designed to permit the Court of 
Justice to review the legality of measures adopted by the institutions.48 
Thus the EU follows European rule of law traditions which, as mentioned above, can be 
difficult to clearly define but which have a liberal basis. It is notable that the EU seems to 
distinguish between ‘rule of law’ and ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’ in a Razian fashion. It 
                                                 
46 See for example Chinese companies’ access to the EU Courts concerning non-market treatment of Chinese 
companies in EU antidumping determinations; Changzhou/Zheijiang v Council, Case T-255/01, judgment of the 
Court of First Instance, 23 October 2003, ECR 2003, p. II-4741; and concerning the fundamental principle of 
respect for the right of a defence, Foshan Shunde Yongjian Housewares & Hardware v Council, Case C-141/08 
P, judgment of the ECJ, 1 October 2009, ECR 2009, p. I-9147. 
47 See Art. 263(4) of the TFEU 
48 Case 294/83 Les Verts v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, paragraph 23. See also Kadi and Al Barakaat 
International Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351, para. 281 
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is also notable that the EU texts distinguish between universal values ‘human dignity, freedom, 
equality and solidarity’ which leave out ‘rule of law’. However, the ECJ will go far to protect 
fundamental rights. In Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and 
Commission (hereafter; Kadi), the EU institutions had adopted a regulation in line with a UN 
Security Council Resolution which would freeze Kadi’s finances as Kadi appeared on a list of 
suspected terrorists by the UN Security Council. The EU institutions wanted to comply with 
the Resolution from the UN Security Council. In the case, the ECJ found that fundamental 
rights had been breached by the EU institutions as Kadi was prevented from the use of his 
property and that he had not had a fair hearing. Thus the ECJ upholds rule of law by reviewing 
the acts of the EU institutions and by stressing natural justice. Kadi has also a multilevel rule 
of law dimension which will be discussed below.  
The concept of rule of law in a European context can be seen in light of liberal approaches to 
law: rights and protection of the individual against the public. The Razian rule of law, although 
asserted to be value neutral, takes the liberal fundaments into account: The right to apply the 
courts to challenge administrative decisions or law-making. The ECJ has also held that it is a 
violation of rule of law if law is retrospectively applied.49   
In EU’s external relations, the rule of law is more limited although the actions by the EU 
institutions must be guided by rule of law. Art. 21 of the TEU provides: 
The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the 
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and 
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, 
the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality 
and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter 
and international law  
As mentioned above, Kadi is from an EU internal perspective an example of rule of law 
protection of an EU citizen. However, given the fact that the UN Security Council had provided 
a binding resolution, it can be asked whether the ECJ runs into a rule of law conflict. On one 
hand, the ECJ must comply with law, which in this case goes through the international 
obligations to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions. This is a rule of law question on 
international level; states must comply with their international obligations. On the other hand, 
there is the protection of the individual, Kadi, as fundamental EU law, as mentioned above. In 
Air Transport Association of America and Others the ECJ referred to Kadi emphasising that 
the EU institutions are bound by their international treaty obligations which will prevail over 
EU law.50 That must be seen in relation with EU constitutional law as the ECJ stated in Kadi 
the obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot have the effect 
of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, which include 
the principle that all Community acts must respect fundamental rights, that 
respect constituting a condition of their lawfulness which it is for the Court 
                                                 
49 See for example Case 80/86 Kolpinghuis Nijmegen [1987] ECR 3969, paragraph 13, and judgment of 15 April 
2008 in Impact, C-268/06, EU:C:2008:223, paragraph 100. 
50 Air Transport Association of America and Others, C‑366/10, ECR, EU:C:2011:864, para. 50 
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to review in the framework of the complete system of legal remedies 
established by the Treaty.51   
In addition, the ECJ referred to core values of the EU: 
It is true also that Article 297 EC implicitly permits obstacles to the operation 
of the common market when they are caused by measures taken by a Member 
State to carry out the international obligations it has accepted for the purpose 
of maintaining international peace and security. Those provisions cannot, 
however, be understood to authorise any derogation from the principles of 
liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
enshrined in Article 6(1) EU as a foundation of the Union.52 
In that respect, the ECJ distinguished between secondary EU law, where, as mentioned above, 
international law will prevail in case of conflict, and fundamental rights in which international 
law will not have primacy. However, the ECJ also emphasised that the UN system provides 
the Sanctions Committee where a person may ask to be removed from the terror list but that it 
is “still in essence diplomatic and intergovernmental, the persons or entities concerned having 
no real opportunity of asserting their rights and that committee taking its decisions by 
consensus, each of its members having a right of veto.”53 It seems that the ECJ does not overrule 
the UN Security Council. By contrast it finds with reference to the ECtHR that  
“the freezing of the funds, financial assets and other economic resources of 
the persons identified by the Security Council or the Sanctions Committee 
as being associated with Usama bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaeda 
organisation and the Taliban cannot per se be regarded as inappropriate or 
disproportionate.”54  
Even though that the fundamental guarantees of Kadi had been ignored in the contested EU 
Regulation and thus should be annulled, the ECJ stated that  
“the annulment to that extent of the contested regulation with immediate 
effect would be capable of seriously and irreversibly prejudicing the 
effectiveness of the restrictive measures imposed by the regulation and 
which the Community is required to implement, because in the interval 
preceding its replacement by a new regulation Mr Kadi and Al Barakaat 
might take steps seeking to prevent measures freezing funds from being 
applied to them again. (…) the effects of the contested regulation must (…) 
be maintained for a brief period to be fixed in such a way as to allow the 
Council to remedy the infringements found, but which also takes due account 
                                                 
51 Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351, para. 285 
52 Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351, para. 302-303 
53 Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351, para. 323 
54 Referring to Bosphorus, paragraph 26, and the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Bosphorus 
Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, § 167, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation 
v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351, para. 363. 
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of the considerable impact of the restrictive measures concerned on the 
appellants’ rights and freedoms.”55 
Thus, the ECJ recognizes the obligations under international law, including those 
implementing Resolutions from the Security Council. International law is binding on the EU 
institutions. For example, in Air Transport Association of America and Others, the ECJ found 
with basis in Art. 3(5) of the TEU that the EU institutions are bound by international law, 
including customary international law, when they adopt acts.56 In addition, the ECJ finds 
support in international jurisprudence. In the same case, it referred to the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) and the Permanent Court of Justice as basis for establishing the principle that 
each State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over its airspace, the principle that no State 
may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty, and the principle of 
freedom to fly over the high seas are customary international law.57 However, even though 
international law is binding in the EU system, it cannot derive a person a right from testing EU 
law implementing international law against fundamental rights. It seems that the ECJ is trying 
to strike a balance between international law and EU human rights where both systems are 
satisfied through a harmonious approach instead of a conflict-based approach.58  
Even though EU institutions are bound by international law, there is a question of the 
individual’s access to apply international law before the EU courts. The approach taken by the 
ECJ in respect of the direct applicability of international law is mixed. The ECJ has 
demonstrated a monistic approach in Hageman59 and Kupfberg.60 However, when it comes to 
the applicability of WTO law, the ECJ takes a more dualistic approach. In Portugal v. Council 
the ECJ stated: 
As regards, more particularly, the application of the WTO agreements in the 
Community legal order, it must be noted that, according to its preamble, the 
agreement establishing the WTO, including the annexes, is still founded, like 
GATT 1947, on the principle of negotiations with a view to `entering into 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements' and is thus 
distinguished, from the viewpoint of the Community, from the agreements 
concluded between the Community and non-member countries which 
introduce a certain asymmetry of obligations, or create special relations of 
                                                 
55 Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351, paras. 373-
375. 
56 Air Transport Association of America and Others, C‑366/10, ECR, EU:C:2011:864, para. 101. 
57 The ECJ referred in that respect to Article 1 of the Chicago Convention (see, on the recognition of such a 
principle, the judgment of the International Court of Justice of 27 June 1986 in Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 392, paragraph 212), 
in Article 2 of the Geneva Convention of 29 April 1958 on the High Seas (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 450, 
p. 11) (see also, on the recognition of this principle, the judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice 
of 7 September 1927 in the Case of the S.S ‘Lotus’, PCIJ 1927, Series A, No 10, p. 25) and in the third sentence 
of Article 87(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, signed in Montego Bay on 10 December 
1982, which entered into force on 16 November 1994 and was concluded and approved on behalf of the European 
Community by Council Decision 98/392/EC of 23 March 1998 (OJ 1998 L 179, p. 1), see para. 104. 
58 See also Juliane Kokott and Christoph Sobotta, The Kadi Case – Constitutional Core Values and International 
Law – Finding the Balance? The European Journal of International Law, 23 (4) (2012), 1015-1024, advocating 
that the ECJ does not take a rigid dualist approach here but rather attempts to strike a balance between EU 
constitutional core values and effective international measures against terrorism. 
59 Hageman, Case 181/73, judgment of the EC Court on 30 April 1974, ECR 1974, p. 449 
60 Kupfberg, Case 104/81, judgment of the EC Court on 26 October 1982, ECR 1982, p. 3641, para. 18 
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integration with the Community, such as the agreement which the Court was 
required to interpret in Kupferberg. 61 
The ECJ found that a number of courts of the other WTO Members do not review the legality 
of their respective legislation in light of WTO law and do not allow direct applicability. 
According to the ECJ, if the ECJ allowed direct applicability of WTO law, it “would deprive 
the legislative or executive organs of the Community of the scope for manoeuvre enjoyed by 
their counterparts in the Community's trading partners.”62 The ECJ then rejected direct 
applicability of WTO law.63 However, the ECJ will allow direct applicability of WTO law if 
the EU intends to implement a specific WTO obligation, for example it can be expressed in 
general in secondary acts, or if there in secondary acts are express reference to specific 
provisions of WTO law.64  
It is a mixed rule of law line adopted by the ECJ. One internal line which has a basis in a formal 
rule of law, although with strong emphasis on fundamental rights, whereas a more power 
oriented line in the external trade relations.  
The next sub-part concerns a Chinese rule of law. As China is taking a leading role in OBOR, 
China’s approach to rule of law is important. Differences between European and Chinese rules 
of laws are essential to understand for the OBOR investors in their cross-border investments 
and transactions. 
 
Chinese Approaches to Rule of Law 
Rule of law might have a liberal underpinning which is reflected in the overall rule of law 
framework but its elements vary in degrees. China has on domestic level promoted rule of law, 
which is also a requirement under its WTO commitments,65 but special characteristics of 
Chinese rules of law with a strong centralized state and with emphasis on the collective over 
the individual is different from the more liberal oriented European rule of law systems.66 
In the 1980s, politicians and academics in China discussed the particular political structure of 
China post-Mao. Should China be a rule of man or a rule of law society? The difference 
between those concepts, although the classification cannot be clearly established, is that in a 
rule of man system the ruler is not bound by law but must instead comply with moral virtues.67 
                                                 
61 Portugal v Council, Case C-149/96, judgment of the EC Court on 23 November 1999, ECR I-8395, para 42  
62 Portugal v Council, Case C-149/96, judgment of the EC Court on 23 November 1999, ECR I-8395, para 46 
63 Paras. 42-47 
64 See for example Biret v Council, Case C-93/02 P, judgment of the EC Court on 30 September 2003, ECR 2003, 
p. I-497, para. 63. 
65 Accession of the People’s Republic of China, of 23 November 2001, WT/l/432, 2C and 2D and Henrik 
Andersen, China and the WTO Appellate Body’s Rule of Law, Global Journal of Comparative Law 5 (2016) 146 
at 158. See lately Supreme People’s Court Deputy Secretary Jiang Bixin addressing “Implementing the Rule of 
Law for Guaranteeing the Five Development Concepts” on June 8, at the “Hundred Jurists and Hundred Lectures”, 
cf. David Gitter, Why China Both Loves and Fears the Rule of Law, The Diplomat, June 25 2016. 
66 Tao Li and Zuoli Jiang, Does China follow the West? A Perspective of State-Citizen Interaction in Foreign 
Trade Governance, Baku State University Law Review, 2 (2) (2015-2016) 177 at 192-195. See for a nuanced 
discussion on rules of law in China; Randall Peerenboom, ‘Competing Conceptions of Rule of Law in China’ in 
R. Peerenboom (ed), Asian Discourses of Rule of Law – Theories and implementation of rule of law in twelve 
Asian countries, France and the US (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 113.  
67 Leigh K. Jenco, “Rule by Man” and “Rule by Law” in Early Republican China: Contributions to a Theoretical 
Debate, The Journal of Asian Studies,  69 (1) (February 2010) 181. 
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The de facto leader, Deng Xiaoping, wanted economic and social reforms of China where rule 
of law should be the instrument to achieve the goals. He established 5 principles of laws that 
should govern China; 1) there must be laws for people to follow, 2) laws must be observed, 3) 
law breakers must be dealt with accordingly, 4) law enforcement must be strict, and 5) we are 
all equal before the law.68 The instrumental approach to rule of law might fit the Razian rule of 
law claim that rule of law cannot pass judgment on law. But as mentioned above, there are 
some essential elements of rule of law which law should not violate in order to keep rule of 
law effective. Thus rule of law cannot be solely instrumental and value-neutral. Deng 
Xiaoping’s system has been characterized as rule by law, i.e. the law is used as instrument to 
carry out the ruler’s ideas without constraints on the ruler.69 However, China has gradually 
changed from a planned economy towards a socialist market economy, and it has moved to a 
judicial oriented governance system.70 Rule of law is now codified in Art. 5 of the Constitution 
of the PRC. The Constitution is fundamental law and must be complied with by citizens, 
Government and political parties.71 But in contrast to the European liberal versions of rule of 
law, the Chinese rule of law must be understood in context of its socialist system. Art. 5 
provides;  
The People’s Republic of China governs the country according to law and 
makes it a socialist country under rule of law. 
The State upholds the uniformity and dignity of the socialist legal system.  
No laws or administrative or local regulations may contravene the 
Constitution.  
All State organs, the armed forces, all political parties and public 
organizations and all enterprises and institutions must abide by the 
Constitution and other laws. All acts in violation of the Constitution or other 
laws must be investigated.  
No organization or individual is privileged to be beyond the Constitution or 
other laws. 
In the 1980s, China advanced court adjudication as the preferred dispute resolution in civil 
cases although lately there has been a turn towards increased mediation.72 The Chinese 
                                                 
68 Carlos Wing-hung Lo, China’s Legal Awakening – Legal Theory and Criminal Justice in Deng’s Era, (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995) at 38. 
69 Jiefen Li, Legal Reform Versus the Power of the Party and State in the People’s Republic of China – Rule of 
Law or Rule By Law? (Lewiston/Lampeter/Queenston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2008) at 30-39. 
The difference between “rule of law” and “rule by law” lies with the accountability of the ruler for the laws 
formulated, which must comply with constitutional principles but both systems require the ruler to comply with 
law. However, in a rule by law system, the ruler can change law in a manner which will fit the ruler’s will. A rule 
of men and rule by law debate took place in China after the Republic was established in 1911 and new political 
institutions were formed to govern. See more about the theoretical scope and interaction between rule of men and 
rule by law in Leigh K. Jenco, “Rule by Man”and“Rule by Law” in Early Republican China: Contributions to a 
Theoretical Debate, The Journal of Asian Studies, 69 (1) (February-2010) 181 
70 Tao Li and Zuoli Jiang, Does China follow the West? A Perspective of State-Citizen Interaction in Foreign 
Trade Governance, Baku State University Law Review, 2 (2) (2015-2016) 177 at 186 
71 Albert H. Y. Chen, China’s Long March Towards Rule of Law or China’s Turn Against Law? Chinese Journal 
of Comparative Law, 4 (1) (2016) 1 at 7 
72 Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, American Journal of Comparative Law, 59 (4) (2011) 935  
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Constitution does not give room for judicial control of law production. In the constitutional 
system, the People are supreme and their will is expressed through the representatives of the 
law making organ; the National People’s Congress (NPC). Its standing organ, the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC), has the interpretative authority of the 
Constitution and authority to provide legislative reviews of law. That authority is not granted 
the Supreme People’s Court (SPC). However, the courts of China have occasionally referred 
to the Constitution as a source of law, although the line of constitutional application by the SPC 
is not clear and appears to be limited.73   
Even though Chinese law appears to have a positive legal basis in the legislation by the NPC 
and NPCSC, it cannot be ruled out that a higher ranking norm system can serve as guiding 
convention of Chinese leaders and law making. In line with Western natural law theories, 
Chinese traditional law theories had higher ranking norms which should guide the leaders. For 
example, cosmological approaches seeking harmony in the universe between tian (Heaven) 
and ren (Human) where the early Confucians saw the moral role of the ruler was to carry out 
the intentions of Heaven. Moral Confucian and Neo-Confucian approaches differed from the 
cosmological approaches by deducing principles of morality from humans instead of Heaven, 
and which Maccormick compares with some reservations to the European legal and political 
philosophers Grotius and Pufendorf,74 and their secular approaches to law and the relationship 
between natural and positive law with natural law’s higher ranking set of norms.75 One moral 
approach derives from human nature which through the mind constructs a universal set of 
higher law. Another moral approach derives from Confucius’ li (rite or custom) which has been 
compared to Western natural law. However, it is criticised as li – in contrast to the universal, 
static nature of natural law – is based on custom and is changeable and thus may not be 
comparable to a Western natural law.76 Where the Confucian li would consider the moral code 
as fundamental for guiding society, and law with only an inferior role due to its penal character, 
later legalists advocated for codification of law and punishment for its violations.77  
It cannot be ruled out that Confucian philosophy has an important impact on Chinese society. 
Even though Deng Xiaoping took a pragmatic approach to law – and pragmatism is important 
as seen in the OBOR – the idea of overall guiding principles, which is channelled through the 
Communist Party of China (CPC), and strong authority by the CPC, can be in line with 
                                                 
73 Cheng Xueyang, Institutional Developments, Academic Debates and Legal Practices on the Constitutional 
Review in China: 2000-2013, Frontiers of Law in China, 9 (4) (2014) 636 at 640; Zou Keyuan, International Law 
in the Chinese Domestic Context, Valparaiso University Law Review 44 (2010) 935 at 953. 
74 In his prolegomena to the ‘On the Law of War and Peace’, Grotius, after stating that maintenance of social order 
is desired in every human being and thus through reason natural law is established, went on to say “What we have 
been saying would have a degree of validity even if we should concede that which cannot be conceded without 
the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or that the affairs of men are of no concern to Him”, Hugo Grotius, 
De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres, Vol Two (1625), translated by Francis Kelly, (Buffalo, New York: William S. 
Hein & Co., Inc., 1995), Prolegomena, para 11, at 13. See also Pufendorf’s natural law where law is discovered 
through reason and where self-preservation of ourselves makes it necessary for human beings to create order and 
sociality. See Samuel von Pufendorf, Political Writings – On the Duty of Man and Citizens (1673), Tully (ed), 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Book I, Chapter 3, pp. 33-38 
75 Geoffrey MacCormick, Natural Law in Traditional China, Journal of Comparative Law, 8 (2) (2013-2014) 104 
at 117.   
76 Geoffrey MacCormick, Natural Law in Traditional China, Journal of Comparative Law, 8 (2) (2013-2014) 104 
at 121. 
77 See for example Luke T. Lee and Whalen W. Lai, The Chinese Conceptions of Law, Hastings Law Journal, 29 
(6) (1978) 1307 at 1309. 
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Confucian philosophy, although the check-and-balance of compliance with a higher ranking 
morality can be a challenge. The strong authority of the CPC must be seen in light of different 
cultural understandings of “democracy” between various Western traditions and a Confucius 
inspired Chinese version with the Chinese maxim minben, i.e. the welfare of the people is the 
basic foundation of the wealth and power of the State.  Tianjian Shi and Jie Lu explain the two 
different approaches to democracy. They define Western approaches as 
“A set of institutional arrangements created to reach decisions on public 
issues and to ensure good governance. At the heart of these arrangements lie 
open and competitive elections. The system must allow the free flow of 
information so that people can make informed decisions”78 
The Confucian cultural inheritance is reflected to in Chinese perceptions of democracy which 
differs from the liberal European approach by suggesting a leadership from specifically 
qualified elite; legitimacy for government is not based on fair elections but through substance 
and results of policies applied; and participation by ordinary people is limited and mostly left 
to political leaders.79 Thus a more authoritarian approach is legitimate and in order to reach the 
welfare of society and the goals of a strong economy to the benefit of the people, a pragmatic 
approach might be necessary. It is in that context that the relationship between the CPC and 
the Chinese courts must be seen. The Chinese courts do not have the same level of 
independence as courts in Europe. Instead, they are under guidance from the Political-Legal 
Committee which is a part of the CPC organization.80  
A rule of law in China must be understood in light of the specific philosophical, cultural and 
political Chinese traits. What is not clearly formulated in respect of rule of law is where to set 
the balance between the private and the public protection, where a European approach will tilt 
more towards the protection of the private in contrast to a stronger emphasis on the public in 
China.81 The role of the courts are approached differently where the European courts usually 
will be independent and with reviewing authority of acts from legislator,  whereas the courts 
of China is under an overall guidance of the CPC and only have limited reviewing authority of 
legislations’ constitutional conformity. Regardless of the Chinese-European differences, it is 
clear that rule of law has been growing and developed in China since the 1980s. The growing 
importance of rule of law was stressed at the “Hundred Jurists and Hundred Lectures” event 
on 8 June 2016 where the SPC Deputy Secretary Jiang Bixin explained that economic and 
social development in China cannot take place without the rule of law. That is in line with 
President Xi Jinping’s construction of rule of law. However, the CPC issued an opinion that 
lawyers should be under guidelines of political correctness in order to not challenge the state 
on every possible occasion for human rights violations while defending their clients.82 That 
                                                 
78 Tianjian Shi and Jie Lu, The Shadow of Confucianism, Journal of Democracy, 21 (4) (2010) 123 at 125 
79 Tianjian Shi and Jie Lu, The Shadow of Confucianism, Journal of Democracy, 21 (4) (2010) 123 at 125-126 
80 Zou Keyuan, International Law in the Chinese Domestic Context, Valparaiso University Law Review 44 (2010) 
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82 “Implementing the Rule of Law for Guaranteeing the Five Development Concepts” on June 8, at the “Hundred 
Jurists and Hundred Lectures”, cf. David Gitter, Why China Both Loves and Fears the Rule of Law, The Diplomat, 
June 25 2016. 
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might be a result of human rights getting wider space in Chinese laws, like the 2012 revision 
of the Criminal Procedure Law.83  Rule of law is developing through the interaction between 
on one side a strong authoritative system with economic and social aims realized through rule 
of law as well as a desire to keep face from critique from individuals and the other side the 
individuals’ access to challenge the system. 
In respect of applying international law in the Chinese legal system, it is a legislative task left 
to the NPCSC to decide whether an international treaty can be applied by the courts.84 The 
direct effect of international law in China must be seen in light of the supremacy of international 
law in China. Once it is ratified, international law prevails over national law in case of 
conflict.85 However, in Chinese legislative practice there is wide opening to apply international 
law without reference to specific treaties. For example, Art. 260 of the Civil Procedure Law 
2012 provides: 
If an international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic 
of China contains provisions differing from those found in this Law, the 
provisions of the international treaty shall apply, unless the provisions are 
the ones on which China has announced reservations.86 
It seems that international law can be applied before the Chinese courts even if there is no 
express reference to the international treaty as long as it is ratified. However, it is not clear 
what the position is in respect of international customary law.87 
Rule of law in China has similarities with European rules of law when it comes to the overall 
framework of a rule of law, like access to courts, supremacy of law, equality etc. But those 
similar elements vary in degrees, and there is a stronger political link to rule of law and courts 
in China compared to Europe. Where courts have a higher degree of independence in Europe, 
the courts in China are under the overall guidelines of the CPC. When it comes to those human 
rights which are part of rule of law on abstract level, like the individual’s access to justice, the 
approaches in Europe are different compared to China which favours the collective and social 
rights over the individual and civil rights.88 However, as it was mentioned above, human rights 
are increasingly being written into Chinese law and thus will provide the courts the legal and 
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interpretative tool to include those rights when they interpret the specific acts. But the overall 
constitutional protection of human rights is a legislative matter.  
The OBOR investors must be aware of the rule of law differences between the various OBOR 
states. The differences will be exposed when they want to protect investments and fundamental 
rights. For example, there will be legal expectations in case of investigations against companies 
for competition violations, that could for example be in case an investor allegedly has been 
abusing a dominant position in the construction business to eliminate competitors or if 
competitors have collaborated to the detriment of the public for example by price fixing or by 
collaborating on bids for public procurement, where the investigations against them must be in 
conformity with law and with the necessary protection of their rights to be heard and to access 
the courts. Even though violation of competition law is grave for the market and usually will 
be heavily fined, it is important to keep the balance that the authorities cannot use their power 
to take a company out of the game in order to favour another company. But at the same time, 
rule of law is there to protect the authorities’ right to investigate and to provide justice against 
companies which try to buy their way out through other parts of the political system. That is 
where rule of law must be backed up with sufficient openness in the public system to avoid 
corruption and to hit hard on companies which bribe public officials of judges. In addition, rule 
of law is not there just to protect companies, but it is also there to protect employees against 
abuse by employers, to protect employees against forced labour situations, and to protect health 
and safety at work as long as law provides for it. Thus a comparison between the levels of rules 
of laws in different systems should be carried out by the companies and other participants 
involved in OBOR. It is where China through OBOR can make requirements on participating 
states to uphold at least a minimal level of rule of law.89  
Where this sub-part mainly has focused on differences between rules of laws from systems 
with authority to punish and to make law, the next sub-part will look at some rule of law 
challenges at international level. 
 
Globalization and Transnational Rule of Law 
OBOR is a global project and it will pose both international and transnational rule of law 
challenges but where China can make an important input. Globalization is in itself a concept 
which is part of shaping the legal barriers. It has been defined by Stiglietz as  
”The closer integration of the countries and the peoples of the world which 
has been brought about by enormous reduction of costs of transportation and 
communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flow of 
goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across 
borders”90 
Globalization involves cross-border issues and it is necessary to facilitate the transnational 
activities by providing relevant legal tools for investors. However, globalization brings 
according to Coleman and Maogoto “systems of governance and regulation that sit above 
                                                 
89 See more below about China’s promotion of transnational rule of law. 
90 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: Norton & Company, 2002), 9.  
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states.”91 The problem is when different systems of law cross into each other as illustrated above 
with the EU and the Kadi case; rule of law works on different levels. It has a territorially 
confined domestic scope but it is also applied on international level.  
The rapid transactions of ideas, goods, services, capital as well as global threats like terrorism 
etc. is a challenge to the statist assumptions of sovereignty which are the fundamental pillars 
of international law. From a European angle, state sovereignty is often associated with the 1648 
Westphalian peace which fundamentally changed the view on law as universal and given by 
God. Instead, law took a turn towards man-made positive law and gradually shifted from the 
universal divine and natural law towards a territorially delimited norm system.92 Westphalian 
sovereignty implied that a state’s internal political structures and policies could not be 
challenged by other states.  
The concept of sovereignty has developed in theory over time and has neither in theory nor in 
practice achieved a clear definition. For example, Krasner categorises ‘sovereignty’ as either; 
Westphalian, domestic, international legal, or interdependence.93 Coleman and Magoto writes 
that sovereignty is a fluid concept where differences in degree of absoluteness between Europe 
and China lies in how Europe and China rose from chaos in the feudal time.94 The importance 
of considering the concept of sovereignty lies in the methodological approaches to legal 
questions and rule of law on international level. European states have through their economic 
and political integration in the EU been granting authority to regional institutions to both 
interfere into national matters, i.e. the internal sovereignty, and with strong acceptance of 
European courts to handle human rights issues, demonstrated a soft intra-European sovereignty 
approach in contrast to China where institutions outside China only have limited impact in the 
Chinese legal system. But where the intra-European approach might be soft, the EU takes a 
harder approach in its external relations as mentioned above, for example in respect of its WTO 
policies. 
Rule of law on international level is limited by the sovereign states. Where rule of law protects 
the minor power against the major power and has some inherent protection of the individual 
against the state; the individuals access to try governmental decisions against her/him before 
an impartial, third-party institution; and with the right to expect law not to be retrospective, 
rule of law on international level must be understood with some reservations. Protection of the 
individual’s right under international law and access to courts is on international level limited 
as most international courts do not grant individuals standing with exception of, for example, 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which offers 
arbitration in investment disputes where private investors can challenge ICSID Member States 
in any legal dispute arising out of an investment between the state and the individual,95 or as 
                                                 
91 Andrew Coleman and Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, “Westphalian” Meets “Eastphalian” Sovereignty: China in 
a Globalized World, Asian Journal of International Law, 3 (2013) 237 at 239 
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93 Krasner, Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999) at 3 
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95 Art. 25 of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, 18 March 1965. The arbitration award is binding on the disputing parties, cf. Art. 53 and Art. 54. China 
has signed but not ratified the ICSID Convention. 
21 
 
mentioned above, the ECtHR. Application of international law at national level is under the 
constraints of the respective states monistic, soft Chinese dualist or hard dualist approaches to 
international law. Nevertheless, the concept of rule of law has found its way into the 
international arena and it is an important principle in respect of providing legal certainty in 
international disputes. As mentioned above, rule of law has different definitions within the UN 
and it is expected that international organizations, besides the states, comply with a rule of law. 
Rule of law is a concept that is applied and developed in various international regimes. For 
example, in the WTO it is held by both Appellate Body Members and by Director-Generals 
that the Appellate Body is upholding ‘rule of law’. For example, the Appellate Body reviews 
the conformity of WTO member states’ law with WTO law.96 Clearly a rule of law in that 
context must be understood with state sovereignty as basis of international law where the 
Appellate Body should not put a state in a situation where its WTO or other obligations under 
international law can potentially be violated. In addition, the development of a rule of law in 
the WTO might take another direction than rule of law developed in other regimes, like the 
UN, ICSID, EU, International Labour Organization (ILO), etc. 
In addition, a distinction must be made between different sectors where some have a stronger 
hard-law approaches compared to some soft-law oriented. For example, the WTO treaties are 
binding on the WTO Members and in general regional trade organizations have a similar 
pattern by providing hard law treaties. In contrast, international financial law is largely soft law 
oriented. For example, the Basel Accords (Basel I, II and III) which were agreed by the 
Members of the Basel Committee and Banking Supervision are non-binding although they turn 
into hard law instruments through their implementation in national and/or EU law.97 In the 
intergovernmental relations, the Basel Accords in themselves do not create legal expectations 
but rather political expectations of implementation.98 Thus rules of law in the financial sector 
might be more fragmented due to their national implementation in various systems compared 
to the stronger rule of law development in the WTO. 
OBOR is a global project with transnational and international rule of law challenges. Private 
and public investors and companies from different jurisdictions will be involved with law from 
other states and international institutions in cross-border transactions and with legal 
expectations deriving from national, regional and international law. OBOR must establish 
institutions to handle the various legal, economic and political issues that may appear. As 
mentioned above, the AIIB is established to handle infrastructural projects in Asia and is an 
important institution in the OBOR plans. Other institutions have a wider global purpose, like 
the WTO, where OBOR will have to comply with the WTO requirements, like free trade 
                                                 
96 Henrik Andersen, China and the WTO Appellate Body’s Rule of Law, Global Journal of Comparative Law 5 
(2016) 146 at 166. 
97 The members are national central banks, like People’s Bank of China. The Basel Committee on Banking 
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agreements, the EU-China antidumping issues, and trade facilitation, and will thus come under 
the WTO regime’s emerging rule of law.99  However, as rule of law is not well developed on 
the international stage – and with its sectorial differences, like human rights, security, trade, 
labour, environment, health, investment, finance etc. administrated by functional communities 
like the UN, the WTO, the ILO, ICSID, World Health Organization (WHO), IOSCO etc. – 
China will through OBOR have the opportunity to influence on that development.  
 
The OBOR Rule of Law Challenges: Soft and Hard Approaches 
Rules of laws from various systems and from different levels will be a challenge when they 
interact through OBOR. There might be rule of law gaps leading to legal uncertainty for the 
market agents. It is important that the policy coordination between the OBOR participating 
states and other major OBOR institutions takes rule of law challenges into consideration. 
Commentators have pointed out that Chinese influence will spread with OBOR. Economic 
cooperation in around 60 countries requires some central planning between a number of 
jurisdictions with China as primus motor. It will manifest China as a Great Power on the 
international stage. A Great Power is an actor which according to Arase has “the ability to 
determine the nature of international order”.100 This is where China can take an important part 
in defining and reshaping rules of laws at transnational and international level. China has 
officially promoted transnational rule of law. At a UN General Assembly Session, the 
representative of China, Mr. Wang, suggested that  
“in an increasingly globalized world, the international community should 
facilitate the promotion of the rule of law at the national and international 
levels, allowing them to inform and complement each other (…) [and] “there 
was a need to take into account individual States’ specificities while 
upholding universal principles”101 
A transnational rule of law should then avoid conflict with the legal and political systems it 
enters into and instead keep harmony between the systems. Thus the specific cultural, 
economic, and political differences between the systems, where in particular human rights can 
be an issue, must be balanced by the transnational rule of law. The question is how far rule of 
law can take such differences. As mentioned above, rule of law should not be detached from 
certain values in order to have a minimum level of effectiveness. 
 
China: Soft and Hard Approaches to International Law and Relations 
China adheres to the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence” which are mutual respect for 
each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-
interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful 
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coexistence. The five principles originated in the Soviet Communist vocabulary in the 1920s 
and were codified in a treaty between China and India in 1954. The principles caused some 
debate between Western and Eastern states as the Soviet Union wanted the principles to be 
incorporated into the UN system. The question was what the principles contained and whether 
peaceful coexistence was rather “a balance of peace through strength.”102  In 1970, the UN 
General Assembly, after years of considerations of form and content, adopted the Declaration 
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations which reflects the Five Principles 
of Peaceful Co-Existence.103 China has consistently referred to the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Co-Existence in its international relations in the last 60 years. They form the core framework 
which cannot be derogated from in the international relations.104 They are in some way part of 
international law but the question is how to conceptualise them. It is important to bear in mind 
that the East-West Cold War era is changed today and thus the principles must be understood 
in their contemporary context.105 Where China on the one side stands strongly on those basic 
pillars, China on the other side demonstrates flexibility by the high engagement in international 
law, in particular in the WTO, and by complying with international law and by importing 
principles from other systems into China. For example, China has to a large degree changed 
and strengthened its judicial system as part of its WTO commitments.106  
The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence will play an important part in the OBOR plans. 
They were mentioned by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China in their statement 
concerning OBOR: 
“The Belt and Road Initiative is in line with the purposes and principles of 
the UN Charter. It upholds the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: 
mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual 
non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, 
equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence”107 
                                                 
102 Russell H. Fifield, The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, The American Journal of International Law, 
52 (3) (1958) 504 at 509 
103 UN General Assembly Resolution 2625(XXV) of 24 October 1970, Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, A/RES/25/2625. The Declaration considers the following principles: The principle that States shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations; The 
principle that States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international 
peace and security and justice are not endangered; The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter; The duty of States to co-operate with one another in 
accordance with the Charter; The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; The principle of 
sovereign equality of States; The principle that States shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them 
in accordance with the Charter. 
104 See Ella Gorian and Kristina Gorian, Chinese Conception of International Law as the Response to the 
challenges of Today, Mediterranean Journal of Social Science, 6 (3) (2015) 236-240. 
105 However, there are recent events in Europe with EU countries on one side and Russia on the other side which 
seem to cause increased tensions between them, like the Crimean Crisis of 2014. 
106 Accession of the People’s Republic of China, of 23 November 2001, WT/L/432 
107 Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, 
2015/03/28, Issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, with State Council authorization, March (2015), part 
II: Principles.  
24 
 
With that basic framework, China will exercise its soft power. Where ‘power’ from a European 
perspective will refer to the ability to change behaviour or attitude of someone else, the concept 
of ‘power’ is in Chinese philosophy related to morality where, from a Confucian perspective, 
the morality from within will provide a strong outside power.108 Thus soft power is the ability 
to change behaviour of other states without exercising hard power like political, legal or 
economic pressure. It is dialogue-based instead of conflict-based. Where China will take a hard 
line on territorial issues, it will take a soft approach when it comes to creating win-win 
situations with OBOR and international trade. There is the pragmatic element; China gains 
economic and diplomatic advantages, but there is also the idea of attempting higher level of 
harmony among all participants without imposing the Chinese system on others and in 
particular without overstepping territorial boundaries.  
The OBOR rule of law challenges must be seen in context of the soft and hard power oriented 
Chinese policies. The economic OBOR cooperation is from a Chinese angle best served with 
a policy-led trade facilitation with diplomatic solutions to disputes in contrast to a European 
approach with binding rules and dispute settlement system.109 According to Arase, the key 
principles for governing OBOR will be 1) bilateral agreements and reciprocity, 2) protection 
of “the principles bottom line” (yuanze dixian) which are Chinese core interests, i.e. protection 
of its political system with a strong and authoritative CPC and its hard approach to state 
sovereignty, and 3) an international rule of law to avoid arbitrary state power and to ensure 
compliance with bilateral agreements.110 As mentioned above, OBOR will not only establish 
institutions for the specific OBOR purposes, but OBOR will also step into already established 
institutions with emerging rules of law. If those established institutions form a hard frame of 
economic, political and legal commitments, China can exercise its soft power within those 
frames. For example, in the WTO Dispute Settlement System China intervenes as third party 
providing its suggestions on legal interpretation, which in my view is a soft approach, in 
contrast to the cases where China is involved as one of the disputants. Thus a WTO rule of law 
can be influenced both through the soft and hard channels. However, the question is whether 
OBOR will establish other dispute settlement mechanisms to handle issues which cannot be 
resolved through diplomatic channels and which are not already established in the existing 
multilateral frameworks. 
One issue which can lead to some differences of opinion between China and Europe is human 
rights. For example, OBOR will require millions of workers performing in the construction 
sector. However, it will be problematic if OBOR opens up for mistreatment of workers as, for 
example, the forced labour-like conditions for migrant workers in Qatar in the preparation for 
the FIFA World Cup 2022.111 On one side, China wants to comply with the UN Charter and its 
international obligations which includes human rights, although they are not clearly defined. 
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There are treaty obligations in ICESCR and overall commitments in the UN Charter and 
indirectly human rights obligations as interpretative context for other treaties, but on the other 
side, the CPC wants to provide guidance to lawyers defending their clients about application 
of human rights in order to avoid criticism. It must as a rule of law minimum be expected that 
China complies with its treaty obligations under international law. The question is what 
requirements to human rights OBOR will have and whether a soft or hard approach will be 
taken. If the aim is not to interfere into other states internal affairs by following the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, it should, both from a moral and legal hard perspective, be 
required that the international human rights are complied with in order to follow both the UN 
Charter’s abstract human rights requirements as well as complying with rule of international 
law. However, hard and soft approaches should not be considered as two diametrically 
opposites. The hard and soft approaches can complement each other; where law provides the 
frame for rights and obligations, it is not unchangeable. Law is changed through negotiation 
and through its application as the world changes. Even if a soft approach is taken towards 
OBOR, there will still be some hard points of reference, like existing law, The UN Charter and 
China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence. Thus the soft works in the hard, and the hard 
works in the soft. States involved with OBOR can be influential on suggesting that they will 
comply with international human rights and international labour standards – in this case their 
treaty obligations as a minimum. A harder line through legal, political or economic pressure 
concerning OBOR and its expected trade benefits should be adopted if it shows that the states 
do not comply with their legal commitments. Otherwise market uncertainties may be created 
to the detriment of the OBOR aims of highly efficient allocation of resources and integration 
of markets. In addition, non-compliance will be a violation of the OBOR aim of common 
ground between the different civilizations. But there can be different ways to communicate a 
hard approach where it can be fruitful as a starting point to approach violations of law in an 
informal manner in order to avoid public embarrassment. If that does not change anything, a 
harder approach should be adopted as OBOR otherwise may lose credibility for investors and 
may appear weak by not protecting the legal expectations through rule of law. 
 
The Transnational and International OBOR Rule of Law Challenges 
Even though soft approaches might be a starting point for OBOR disputes, it seems impossible 
not to involve courts and the harder legal approaches. OBOR involves questions concerning 
comparative law, transnational law, and international law and it will involve both private and 
public parties in a web of contracts, joint ventures, public-private partnerships etc. as well as 
new and already existing bilateral and multilateral agreements between states. From a rule of 
law perspective, a number of issues may arise. Different understandings of rule of law in 
functional communities, like the UN, WTO, ILO etc., and between states may in the first place 
be a core issue as it is decisive for the balance between law and politics and for the legal 
expectations of the private and public participants in OBOR. The strength of rule of law differs 
between the various states and functional communities involved in OBOR. Thus comparative 
approaches to rule of law must be carried out as a strong rule of law will provide a strong 
protection of law against arbitrary decisions compared to a weaker one and will be a benefit 
for the agents on the market. A transnational rule of law can strengthen the weaker systems 
and, as mentioned above, China has advocated for transnational rules of law. The idea of 
transnational rule of law could be an important part of OBOR. 
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The various participating parties in OBOR will face a number of rule of law challenges in their 
cross-border activities. A contract between a party in China and a party in Europe can be called 
into question for various issues. There will be questions of jurisdiction and enforcement of 
other jurisdictions’ decisions and there will be questions concerning choice of law. In pure intra 
EU affairs, such issues are resolved through treaties. The Brussel I Convention and the Lugano 
Convention concern jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters and enforcement of judgments 
from participating states.112 Enforcement of judgments from non-parties to Brussels I and 
Lugano is left to national law.113 It is similar in China, where enforcement of judgment from 
other jurisdictions is regulated in the Civil Procedure Law 2012.114 The Civil Procedure Law 
2012 also stipulates that Chinese courts have jurisdiction to handle cases concerning contract 
or property with foreigners if; “the contract is signed or performed within the territory of the 
People’s Republic of China, or the object of the action is within the territory of the People’s 
Republic of China, or the defendant has detainable property within the territory of the People’s 
Republic of China, or the defendant has its representative agency, branch, or business agent 
within the territory of the People’s Republic of China, may be under the jurisdiction of the 
people’s court located in the place where the contract is signed or performed, the subject of the 
action is located, the defendant’s detainable property is located, the infringing act takes place, 
or the representative agency, branch or business agent is located.”115  
In respect of arbitration, the New York Convention, which China and most European States 
are parties to, requires that its Members give effect and recognize arbitration awards from other 
Member States. Even though the New York Convention has been a success, different legal 
approaches by different jurisdictions and, in the case of China, inappropriate intervention by 
the SPC, have caused legal uncertainties,116 and it has been criticised in literature that Chinese 
courts reject foreign arbitration awards if the disputing companies, although with owners from 
different states, are both registered in China.117 The SPC issued in 2015 an opinion concerning 
OBOR which also referred to international arbitration. It stated that it would promote the use 
of international commercial and maritime arbitration and that it would promote the use of the 
New York Convention in the judicial system to recognize foreign arbitration awards. In 
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addition, the SPC stated that lower courts should limit the range of cross-border contracts being 
declared invalid and that it would improve the enforcement of judgments from foreign 
jurisdictions by extending the principle of reciprocity.118  
Besides questions concerning jurisdiction and enforcement, the courts and arbitrators must 
handle questions about choice of law. In Europe, Rome I Regulation concerns contract and 
Rome II Regulation concerns non-contractual obligations.119 In respect of conflict of law of 
contract, Rome I Regulation has universal application which means that if a court in Europe 
has to handle a case between a Chinese and an Egyptian party, the Rome I Regulation must be 
used to decide the law governing the contract.120  In China, the NPCSC adopted in 2010 the 
Law on the Application of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Legal Relationships of the People’s 
Republic of China which regulates all conflict of law matters in civil cases.121 China is also 
party to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG) together with 84 other states122 and it must be assumed that CISG – or principles from 
CISG – can be applied between private parties concerning commercial goods and products.123 
However, there can be cultural differences concerning “contract” where a European approach 
takes a contract as a binding, final document with rules governing amendments whereas a 
Chinese approach is that the contract is to be filled out and where difference in opinion is a 
matter of negotiation instead of litigation.124 
OBOR will also cross into international organizations and their dispute settlement. In the 
complex picture of international law, there are various international courts with different 
mandates. To start with the ICJ; Under Art. 93 of the UN Charter, all UN Members are parties 
to the ICJ. However, the state consent is fundamental for the ICJ. There is no jurisdiction unless 
the disputing parties have given their consent. Some do that multilaterally, for example in the 
Pact of Bogota (1948)125 or the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes 
(1957)126 or unilaterally by an optional clause.127 States like China and France are not bound by 
the ICJ unless they give their consent in specific cases. However, as China is bound by the 
WTO Dispute Settlement System, it will indirectly accept ICJ case law as WTO panels and 
                                                 
118 Supreme People’s Court Monitor, Supreme People’s Court and “One belt One Road”, July 14, 2015; 
https://supremepeoplescourtmonitor.com/2015/07/14/supreme-peoples-court-and-one-belt-one-road/ (retrieved 
on 3 August 2016) 
119 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) and Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) 
120 See Art. 2 of the Rome I. 
121 Guangjian Tu and Muchi Xu, Contractual Conflicts in The People’s Republic of China: The Applicable Law 
in the Absence of Choice, Journal of Private International Law, 7 (1) 2011 179. See about conflict of law 
concerning contracts in Art. 41 of the Law on the Application of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Legal 
Relationships of the People’s Republic of China (2010), NPCSC, 28 October 2010 
122 The UK is not a party to CISG. 
123 CISG does not apply to sales of stocks, shares, investment securities, negotiable instruments or money and of 
ships, vessels, hovercraft or aircraft, CISG Art. 2. 
124 Roman Tomasic, Globalization, Legal Culture, and the Handling of Sino-Australian Commercial Disputes, 
Chinese Journal of Comparative Law, 4 (1) (2016) 149 at 156 
125 American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogota), A-42, Signed at Bogotá, April 30, 1948, Art. V and 
Art. XXXI. 
126 European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, ETS No.023, Strasbourg, 29/04/1957, Art. 1. 
127 See Art. 36(2) of the Statute of the ICJ. 
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Appellate Body refers to ICJ case law as part of their methodology.128 Even though China has 
had reservations towards courts on international level, China is very active in WTO Dispute 
Settlement. Not only as a disputing party but China will in most cases, where China is not a 
disputing party, reserve the third party right to influence on the case.129 WTO panels and AB 
have also referred to other international dispute settlement institutions as part of their 
methodological approach to WTO law, like ICSID.130 For example, in US – Stainless Steel 
(Mexico),131 the AB referred to Saipem S.p.A. v. The People's Republic of Bangladesh in 
support of its role to provide certainty in law, where the ICSID Tribunal had stated about its 
own role that:  
“It also believes that, subject to the specifics of a given treaty and of the 
circumstances of the actual case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the 
harmonious development of investment law and thereby to meet the 
legitimate expectations of the community of States and investors towards 
certainty of the rule of law”132   
Thus, rule of law is developed through various dispute settlement mechanisms on international 
level. Where China influences on WTO Dispute Settlement, WTO Dispute Settlement brings 
indirectly the evolvement of international rules of law by the ICJ and other international 
tribunals to China through its decisions.   
Besides the binding nature of WTO Dispute Settlement, China is bound by the Arbitral 
Tribunals established under the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).133 However, in Philippines – China,134, China rejected the mandate of the Arbitral 
Tribunal as it, according to China, handled territorial issues outside its jurisdiction. In addition, 
China claimed that the dispute should be handled through negotiation as stipulated in bilateral 
agreements between China and the Philippines. Nevertheless, the proceeding continued and on 
12 July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration issued an arbitration award which mostly 
favoured the Philippines’ arguments. China rejected the award and upheld its argument that the 
arbitral tribunal had acted beyond its mandate as the case concerned territorial issues which are 
                                                 
128 See for example EC – Tariff Preferences, WT/DS246/AB/R, adopted on 20 April 2004, footnote 220; US – 
Stainless Steel (Mexico), WT/DS344/AB/R, adopted on 20 May 2008, footnote 308; China – Publications and 
Audiovisual Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted on 19 January 2010, footnote 705. 
129 Henrik Andersen, China and the WTO Appellate Body’s Rule of Law, Global Journal of Comparative Law 5 
(2016) 146. 
130 See for example the Panel in China — Rare Earths, WT/DS431, 432, and 433/R, adopted on 29 August 2014 
with corrections by the AB, para. 7.319, where the Panel referred to the ICSID Arbitration Tribunal, Award on 
Merits, MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. And MTD Chile S.A., ICSID CASE NO. ARB/01/7, to substantiate its interpretation 
of the terms “fair” and “equitable”. 
131 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), WT/DS344/AB/R, adopted on 20 May 2008, footnote 313. 
132 ICSID Arbitration Tribunal, Case No. ARB/05/07, Saipem S.p.A. v. The People's Republic of Bangladesh, 
ICSID IIC 280 (2007), p. 20, para. 67 
133 See Art. 287 of UNCLOS which stipulates that a Member is free to choose the particular means of peaceful 
settlement, including the ITLOS by declaration. As China has not made such declaration, it will automatically be 
Arbitral Tribunal which will settle the issue. 
134 The Republic of the Philippines v The People’s Republic of China (South China Sea Arbitration), PCA Case 
Nº 2013-19, Award by the Arbitral Tribunal on 12 July 2016. 
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beyond the scope of UNCLOS.135 The Chinese argument has found support in literature.136 
However, the case illustrates one of the challenges with international rules of law; 1) if states 
do not accept a court does it render international law ineffective from a rule of law perspective? 
2) how does the international law system ensure check-and-balances of the international courts 
or arbitral tribunals? Those questions are relevant to ask as the OBOR programme is taking 
form and as it progresses. It is from a rule of law perspective unacceptable if OBOR does not 
provide efficient dispute resolution mechanisms at all levels and all sectors of OBOR. Dispute 
resolution mechanisms might vary in OBOR depending on the specific sector and issue where 
some are more flexible than others.137 The main point is that all parties involved in OBOR 
should know in advance what to expect should a dispute occur. That requires that law can be 
effective and that a check-and-balance system applies to institutions involved in settling 
disputes. It might not be sufficient to just let states exercise their influence and power to control 
dispute settlement as there is a risk that those institutions only will reflect the views of the most 
powerful states, in contrast to a soft approach, and that a state can veto against a decision from 
a court if that court has been accepted in the first place to handle disputes with a clearly defined 
mandate and jurisdiction.138  
Where China is forming its international policy on the Five Principles of Peaceful Integration, 
we must understand those principles in light of China’s international obligations which China 
wants to honour. China accepts and complies with the rulings of the WTO panels and Appellate 
Body.139 The core of those issues are trade-related, and may conform with the economic goals 
of China, but there are spill-over effects as environment, human health, animal protection, 
public morality etc. are part of the issues raised in the WTO Dispute Settlement System.140 
Those spill-over effects may cause rule of law developments in other regimes or other regimes 
may influence on WTO law as mentioned above with the ICJ and ICSID. OBOR will involve 
a number of sectorial issues in respect of trade, environment, labour, human rights, financial 
and investment law, climate, etc. Its cross into the WTO will result in WTO rule of law 
developments which may find their way into some of those institutions which will be created 
as a result of OBOR. That could be third party reviews of alleged OBOR inconsistent national 
                                                 
135 It follows from Art. 298 of UNCLOS, a Member can make a declaration where it does not accept compulsory 
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140 See about neo-functionalism and its spill-over effects; Stone Sweet, Alec and Sandholtz, Wayne, 
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law, development of legal predictability, harmonious approaches to issues concerning 
overlapping values, and by upholding law over economic factors.141 
 
Final Thoughts on OBOR Rule of Law Challenges 
OBOR will carry out the Chinese dream of a Eurasian cooperation facilitating trade, exchange 
of culture etc. and it will involve public and private parties at national, regional, and 
international level and will from a legal perspective involve a number of comparative law, 
transnational law, and international law issues where various legal systems will cross into one 
another. The question is which rule of law will apply. As mentioned above, rule of law has 
different dimensions and is applied at different levels.  Rule of law is applied in liberal systems 
as well as in more authoritarian systems. It is necessary for investors of OBOR to make 
comparative analyses of those differences. The challenge of the regional and international level 
is to find the line between state sovereignty, which in itself is a vague concept, and the rule of 
law. In particular, the role of courts at international level can be a challenge. 
The fragmentation of relevant OBOR legal regimes leads to rule of law gaps as it reduces legal 
certainty and it may cause frustrations for investors if they potentially cannot uphold their 
contractual or other claims due to weak enforcement.142 It is necessary to find solutions to such 
rule of law problems where OBOR should provide some overall framework solutions. It will 
here be naive to assume that China will continue the gradually increasing involvement with 
international law and international tribunals without setting its mark on the system. It has done 
so already in a number of occasions, like the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence expressed 
in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and China 
continues its active participation in WTO Dispute Settlement. It is also important to bear in 
mind that international law itself is not static. It is evolving as the World is changing with 
different great powers in the system. It is not only states developing international law. 
International organizations, multinational enterprises and NGOs have their saying in that 
development. From the European conference based model of international law, it has turned 
into a more judicialized system with increase in the numbers of international courts, tribunals 
etc. and certain principles are entrenched in international law. In literature there are debates 
between supporters of constitutional pluralism, where meta-constitutional principles are 
developed from national systems as well as from international law but with deference to the 
respective regimes’ and states’ constitutional limits,143 in contrast to legal pluralism which 
suggest a fragmented picture of international law with political solutions to conflicts.144 China 
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has accepted the framework of the international law model by signing and ratifying a number 
of treaties in various areas and accepting some international courts, like the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System and UNCLOS arbitration. China has also stressed that OBOR must comply 
with the principles of the UN Charter. Thus there is from an international law perspective a 
constitutional, legal and political barrier which OBOR should not cross and which can provide 
some minimum legal expectations for OBOR investors although on a general and abstract level. 
Those expectations relate to enforcement of arbitration awards, inclusiveness in OBOR 
development, protection of international human rights as ratified by the participating states, 
treaty compliance by states, respect of territory, compliance with WTO decisions, and 
upholding rule of law.145 
Where China will protect the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, those principles must 
also be understood in its contemporary form. Even though there will be strong emphasis of the 
power of the CPC and with protection of the group over the individual, China has still 
undergone a number of changes towards a more legal-oriented system with judicial reforms 
and with increased human rights instruments in both Constitution and law, and is – as 
mentioned above – in the process of strengthening the use of international commercial and 
maritime arbitration and the use of the New York Convention to recognize foreign arbitration 
awards. 
It is possible to find rule of law solutions even though rules of law might have inherent elements 
which overlap with one another in a transnational and multilevel system of rules of laws. It is 
in that situation that deference of respective constitutional limits must be recognized and where 
harmonious solutions should be sought but at the same time it must be expected that states 
comply with their international obligations. An example is the abovementioned Kadi case 
where the ECJ found a solution harmonizing a potential overlap between rule of law principles. 
One was to protect the individual’s fundamental rights. Those were treaty based in EU law and 
thus should be upheld in order to comply with rule of law. The other was to comply with the 
UN Charter and the Security Council Resolution. If the ECJ had rejected the Security Council, 
it would have violated another level of rule of law. Instead the ECJ provided the relevant 
institutions the possibility to bring the secondary EU act into conformity with the treaty based 
fundamental rights and at the same time be in conformity with the Security Council Resolution.  
As China has recognised and codified “rule of law” as a fundamental constitutional principle 
of the Chinese political, administrative and judicial system, China and Europe share a common 
concept with both similar and different meanings. Focus should first of all be on what is shared 
– thereafter a look at the differences. Through the differences, it is possible to develop the 
concept of rule of law even further in the OBOR relations. Rule of law will be an abstract 
principle and thus will have room for different political approaches. In addition, the application 
of rule of law will differ between the respective sectors, where some sectors have more soft 
law based approaches with wider flexibility, like the financial sector, compared to the hard law 
oriented sectors, like the trade sectors. However, as mentioned above, in my opinion there are 
some fundamental aspects of rule of law which must be present and which form the lowest 
level of its conceptual and legitimate basis and which should be fundamental in the 
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development of OBOR in order to overcome potential rule of law challenges. If individuals 
participating at any level of OBOR cannot have access to justice if legal obligations or 
fundamental rights have been violated, the incentive to participate may decline. If China wants 
to be a great power, it should through OBOR inspire the OBOR participants to find rule of law 
solutions to reduce the rule of law gaps which will be beneficial for the market participants. 
What can be asked in respect of OBOR is; will there be rule of law requirements on those states 
which will benefit from OBOR? What role will human rights and labour rights, which are 
codified in a number of different international treaties but not all with universal acceptance, 
have in OBOR, like equality before law,146 rights to access justice and fair trial,147 non-
discrimination between men and women in the work place,148 non-acceptance of forced 
labour,149 and health and safety standards at the workplace?150 Can participating companies 
protect their legal expectations through rule of law, like enforcement of contract,151 non-
discrimination in public procurement,152 protection against anticompetitive behaviour?153 
Those questions will require independent third party institutions to handle those legal issues 
which cannot be solved through negotiation or where there is uneven negotiating power 
between the disputing parties. They will require counter measures against corruption in the 
political system,154 and they will require that law can be enforced. 
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